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respect for the common hmnaniry of all people even in the midst
of their differences. 3

Ambivalent Solidarity
Tisha Rajendra and Laurie Johnston

In David Hollenbach's many discussions of the global common good, he
makes frequent reference to the importance of solidariry as a fundamental
component of that common good. We cannot adequately understand or
work toward the common good without two forms of solidarity: first, a
sense of our mutual interdependence and an openness to dialogue with
the other-what Hollenbach calls "intellectual solidarity"-and second, a
willingness to act in accord with that interdependence-"social solidariry."
As the processes of globalization increase our interdependence, the risk is
that exploitation, rather than genuine solidarity, comes to characterize this
interdependence. 1 Globalization offers many opportunities to develop the
virtue of solidarity, but it also poses the risk that the solidarity we develop
may be only a flawed, incomplete form of solidarity, not true solidariry in
justice. On the whole, Hollenbach is optimistic about the possibilities; he
notes the many nongovernmental organizations and transnational movements that are "working to move public opinion, national governments,
and international institutions to adopt norms of action that reflect greater
solidarity with those who are vulnerable and marginalized in the present
global order." 2 Yet he also cautions that such movements may promote
only partial, incomplete forms of solidarity:
Many of these transnational movements working for global justice
are somewhat paradoxically focused on concerns for particular
groups of people-women, the poor, specific ethnic and cultural
minorities. This poses the most challenging question raised by the
phenomenon of globalization-how to achieve effective and universal

' David Hollenbach, The Common Good and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002), l84ff.
21bid., 238.
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He goes on to warn that th.e same type of interest-group politics that
can distort democracy within the United States also poses a risk to justice
and democracy on a global scale. For Hollenbach, solidarity that is particular is problematic; fiowever, we argue in this chapter that authentic
solidariry can be expressed only through particular relationships between
particular groups of people. YetiJ solidarity remains focused only on those
particular relationships, it fa ii s to be truly virtuous.
Genuine solidariry must inclllde specific practices that manifest an enduring commitment ro particu la.r groups of suffering people. It is the particularity of specific others thatclraws our attention and elicits a particular
response. However, limits on our time, resources, and attention prevent us
from engaging in practices of solidarity with all suffering others at once. The
paradox of solidariry is not thar it is at once both universal and particul.ar;
it is that it is only throtLgh the practices of solidarity with specific suffering
others can we attain tbe univ(!rsal solidariry that Hollenbach speaks of.
And yet, as Hollenbach warns ,practices of solidarity can easily go amiss,
resulting not in the developmem of universal solidarity, but in practices that
actually blind us to the humani.ry and suffering of the other. How, then, can
we ensure that particular practices of solidarity lead to the cultivation of
universal solidarity ratlier than a deadening to the suffering of others? By
drawing on a case study of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora and the work of
Martha Nussbaum, this article ilJuminates some aspects of the relationshi.p
between particular practices ofsolidarity and universal solidarity.

THE NATURE OF SOLIDARITY AND COMPASSION
Christian ethicists frequently prioritize the universal dimension of solidarity-the solidarity that extends across borderlines. The paradigmatic
example of universal solidari.ty is the parable of the Good Samaritan.
The Samaritan overcomes the hisroric animosity between Samaritans and
Jews to make an alliance with someone different. Citing this parable, Jon
Sobrino uses the solidarity oHJS churches with Salvadoran churches as a
case study for his examination. l>f solidarity across divisions of nationality,
ethnicity, and economic standling.4

1lbid.
~Jon Sobrino, " Bearing with One ..Another in Faith: A Theological Analysis of Christian
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Sobrino distinguishes solidarity from a mere "alliance of self-interest"
precisely by drawing on this universal dime1rnon of solidarity. He stipulates that solidarity mmt occur between "uncquals"-peoplc who are
not only different from each other but who arc also unequal in social
and economic standing. Solidarity acts as a bridge between groups of
unequals, enabling them to enter into relarion"hips with one another
despite their differences.
Yet 111 examining Sabrina's case study, we can see that solidarity abo
has a second dimension: besides the sense of universal humanity, there 1s
a dimension that arises from the historical particularities of specific relationships. Among all the suffering peoples of the world, the US churches
did not just choose the Salvadoran churches by chance; these relationships
emerged in the particular context of the Salvadoran civil war, which was
funded and supported b) the US government. In establishing relationships
of solidarity with Salvadoran churches, the US churches were acting m
defiance of the foreign policy of their own government. In cultivating
this relationship of solidarity, the US churches were not only drawing on
universal claims about the c.lignity of the peoples of El Salvador; they were
also acting in the context of a particular-and problematic-relationship
between the United Scates and El Salvador more generally. In cultivating bonds of solidarity w1ch Salvadoran churches, the US churches were
attempting to change the nature of that relationship through particular
inst1tut1ons and out of a particular bond of a shared religious tradlClon.
Perhaps nothing points to the role of particularity in solidarity like
compassion. We describe compassion as "suffering with"-a feeling in
one\ own person elicited by the suffering of another. Bryan Massingale
writes that compassion is "both the ground and the fruit of ... solidarity."~
In other words, solidarity arises from this emotional response ro the suffering of another; but the virtue of solidartty also enlarges our hearts,
enabling us to more powerfully feel the suffering of others. In Sobrino 's
case study, the American churches were motivated by their emotional
response to the horrendous suffering experienced by the Salvadoran
people and the role of their own government in that conflict. Compassion, in ocher words, point'> to the particular dimension of solidarit): it
is nor generalized suffering that evokes compassion; it is the specifics of
the suffering of particular, embodied others.
Yet compassion does nor always lead to authentic solidarity. Often,

'>olidam}·," 111 The Prmople of Mt•rcy: Takmg the Crucified l'l'ofJ/e from the Cross (M.iryknoll, NY: Orlm Boob, 1994 ), 14+-..,2.
·Br>·an Massingale, Racial Justin• ,md the C1tl111/ic Umrc/J (Maryknoll, '\,'I: Orbis

Book,, 2014), 118.
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compassion and solidarity become divorced from the universal dimension.
In what follows, we turn to a c1se study of the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora
and examine how and why CD1llpass1011 and solidarity with suffering others went wrong 111 this case.

THE SRI LAt'.KAN TAMIL DIASPORA
From I 983 to 2009 Sri l.anka was ripped apart hy a brutal civil war
that resulted in up to 100,00~ deaths. The roots of the conflict lie in the
British colonial period, during which ethnic Tamils were given opportunities for education and goH':rnmcnt positions were denied to many of
the ma1ority Sinhalese. After Sn Lanka gained independence in 1948,
Sinhalese-ma1onty government-:. enacted a series of d1scnmmacory policies
against Tamils. Following a sen es of unsuccessful peaceful protests, many
in the Tamil community begaa t<> place their hopes in armed militia groups
seeking an independent Tamil state in the historic Tamil homelands of the
north and east of the island. Jn July J 983 Tamil militants killed thirteen
Sinhalese soldiers, setting off mob violence against Tamil civilians in the
capital of Colombo. Jn the a ftennath of this pogrom, one militant group,
the Libera non Tigers ofTamil Eelam (CITE), consolidated its power in the
north and cast by assassinarin g members of other group'>. Meanwhile, the
government of Sn l.anka hac.l 1hiftcd into war mode, ostemibly targeting
the LITE while bombingciviljan areas indiscriminately, disappearing and
detaining thousands of Tami]1~ and placing Tamil ma1oriry areas of Sri
Lanka under military rule. The LITE responded with civilian bombings
and massacres, aso;ass1nation ~ of Indian Prime M1111srer Rajiv Gandhi
and Sn Lrnk.in President Raro<,inghc Premadasa, and an attempted assassination of Sn Lankan Pre..,1dent Chandnka Kumararunga. The LTIF
also inflicted terror on its own people, arresting and torturing dissidents,
recruiting child soldiers, and ("<ecuting suspected informers.
As a result of the conflict, 111ore than 500,000 Tamils left Sri Lanka
in the years following the l 9 SJ riots. While many found themselves in
refugee camps 111 the Indian state of Tamil Nadu, others fled for Canada,
the United Kmgdom, and continental Europe. Due ro 1t'> generous asylum
policies, Canada is home to the largest Tamil diaspora today. Although
the Tamil d1;1Spora I'> by no means a homogenous group with one political
agenda, many in the diasporn fi11anc1ally supported the LTff (frequently
known as the Tamil Tigers) rhmugh thirty years of civil war. An insurgent
group with a shoe'>tring budget, the l TIE had virtually no friends 111
the international communit) and could nor have susramed such a long
insurgency without the supp(lrt of the diaspora. Some in the diaspora
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were coerced into funding the LITE, but much of the diaspora funded
the LITE voluntarily. Though reports of the LITE's brutality against
their own people were widespread and well known in the internationa l
community, the diaspora seemed to turn a blind eye to reports of chi ld
conscription, assassinations of Tamil moderates, and the use of civilians
as human shields. ln the aftermath of the war, the diaspora has called for
an investigation into war crimes committed by the Sri Lankan government
against Tami l civilians; however, the diaspora has not called for a similar
investigation into war crimes committed by the LITE. 6
Although the Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora would have described itself as
acting in solidarity with the civilian Tamils Living on the island, this is a
case of flawed solidarity; the interventions chosen by the Tamil diaspora
did not lead to peace nor to the flourishing of either Sri Lanka community or the international community. Solidarity is dependent on what
Martha Nussbaum calls accurate "judgments of compassion." 7 In order
to examine why the solidarity of the diaspora went wrong, we examine
Nussbaum's account of compassion as applied to the Tamil diaspora.
Martha Nussbaum writes that compassion involves three separate judgments. First, we must note that someone else is suffering and accurately
assess the seriousness of the suffering. ls the suffering significant enough
to truly affect a person's flourishing? The second judgment of compassion
is whether the suffering is undeserved. The third judgment of compassion
is whether the other's suffering affects the self in some way.
The first judgment of compassion, accurately assessing the fact and
the scope of another's suffering, requires openness ro reality and an accurate judgment of reality. The Sri Lankan Tamil diaspora had no trouble
accurately assessing the scope of the suffering of their compatriots. The
first generation had themselves suffered directly either at the hands of the
Sri Lankan government or at the hands of Sinhalese mobs during bouts
of ethnic violence. Surely, they would have had no trouble imagining the
suffering of Tamil civilians, nor would they have failed to see the seriousness of their situations. However, there were a lso forms of suffering
that most diaspora Tamils seem to have overlooked. Although it is nor
reasonable to expect anyone to be fully aware of all the world's sufferings, these forms of suffering were in fact quite proximate and relevant

' International (mis (,roup, "The 'H• l .ankan l~1m1l D1aspora after the l Tri ,"I ehru;1ry

23, 2010, www.c.:n\1~group.org, 1S. See abo Report of rhe 011( I IR lnvesnganon on Sn
Lanka (OlSL ), A/l IRC/30/CRP.2 (U111tec.I Nations l luman Rights Council, 2015 ) anc.I lntern;monal Cnw.. Group, "War Cnmcs 1n Sn Lanka," !Viar 17, 2010, www.a1s1..,group.org.
Martha Nussbaum, "Compa\s1on anc.I Terror," Dacda/11s U2, no. I (Wintt'r 2003):
14-17.
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to the Tamil population, partimlarly when they involved the recruitment
of child soldiers.
During the war, many in the diaspora were getting their news from
only a few sources with a pro-I.TIE bias, such as TamilNet, a news source
with a separatist agenda. Ma J()r news outlets in the West did not devote
much space or time to the conflict, and the ones that did were considered by the diaspora ro have received one-sided information from rhe
Sri Lankan government. Essentially, many in the diaspora had applied a
cognitive filter to any news enierging from Sri Lanka: atrocities committed by the Sri Lankan government were real; atrocities committed by the
LITE had been fabricated. A hhough it is common for humans to prefer
information that confirms ou rown biases, there is a point ar which such
bias constitutes culpable ignorance.
Nussbaum's second judgme11t of compassion is whether the suffering is
undeserved. One cannot make this ~econd judgment without the first. In
other words, we are less likely to feel compassion for someone if we feel
they have done something to CLrn their suffering. Nussbaum presents the
example of a teenager who is jailed for torturing an ima Is; we are unlikely
to feel much compassion for lu m. Yet if a criminal is given a punishment
far more severe than would fit the crime, we may feel compassion for
her, despite her guilt. But such complex judgments of desert frequently
disappear in the polarized environment of a war, when "you're either
with us or you're against us." For many Tamils, those who suffered at the
hands of Sri Lankan govern01ent forces were generally perceived to be
undeserving of such treatmellt. But this was not the same for those who
suffered at the hands of the LTTE.
This tendency to evade compassion by dismissing suffering as "deserved" was applied not only 10 the Sinhalese civilians; Tamil moderates
were also held to he deserving in some sense of their suffering. One
example is Neelan Tiruchelv-am, a Tamil Member of Parliament who
worked within the Sri Lankangovernment to craft laws that would give
the predominantly Tamil nortliern and eastern provinces of Sri Lanka a
measure of political autonomr.For his work with the Sinhalcse-dominared
Sri Lankan government and toward a nonviolent resolution of the war,
Tiruchelvam was assassinate<! in 1999, presumably by the LITE. The
LITE, whom he had publicly uiticized throughout his career, deemed him
a traitor to his own people. Fo llowing the lead of the LT ff, the diaspora
similarly dismissed Tiruchelva.01 as a traitor. In the polari1,ed environment
of a civil war, this man who ac1i vely expressed solidarity with Tamils was
nor regarded as deserving of 'i{)lidariry in return.
The third judgment of con1passion likewise follows from the first and
<;Ccond judgments. Nussbaum terms this the"eudaimonistic judgment"-
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the judgment that the suffering of another person affects us in some way.
In the parlance of many Christian ethicists, this third judgment of compassion is solidarity itself-the idea that because we are all interdependent,
the suffering of one person affects another. This is what moves a person
from merely suffering-with another person to acting to alleviate their
suffering. Since the eudaimonistic judgment follows from the other two,
flaws in the first two judgments prevented the Tamil diaspora from applying the eudaimonistic judgment to all who suffered from the war in Sri
Lanka. Reporting based on interviews with members of the diaspora, the
international Crisis Group states, "A palpable sense of guilt pervades the
Tamil diaspora. Privately, some express shame for leaving Sri Lanka while
other Tamils fought and died for the cause or fell victim to government
violence." 8 The guilt is a manifestation of the eudaimonistic judgment.
Of course, this eudaimonistic judgment had its limits. While the Tamil
diaspora felt that they in some sense shared the fates of the Tamils on the
island who were persecuted by the government, their sense of solidarity
did not extend to the Sinhalese majority, who were perceived as deserving any suffering meted our by the LITE or the Sri Lankan government. 9
The Tamil feelings of bitterness toward the Sinhalese are not completely
unwarranted; Sinhalese majority governments had been depriving Tamils
of civil and political liberties since shortly after independence in 1948. A
strand of Buddhism that emerged during British colonialism in Sri Lanka
insists that the island must be an ethnically pure, Sinha la Buddhist state. 10
The Sri Lankan army terrorized the Tamil civilian population, targeting
sanctuaries, the Jaffna public library, and disappearing thousands, and
few of the Sinhalese majority protested these war crimes.
Authentic compassion, according to Nussbaum, requires accuracy in
the three judgments. Thus the case of the Tamil diaspora illustrates failings in all three. Nussbaum's first judgment of compassion requires an
openness to what Jon Sobrino, drawing on the work of Ignacio Ellacuria,
would call " reality." But the filters applied to the news coming out of Sri
Lanka simply erased the wrongdoing of the LITE. When the news of the
LITE's activities became irrefutable, such as in the assassinations of Tamil
moderates and civilian-targeted bombings, it was instead the second judgment of compassion that failed: the victims of the LITE were taken to be
deserving of their suffering in some sense. The third judgment of com pas-

1Inrernational

Crisis Group Report, " Sri Lankan Tamil Diaspora after the LTfE," 4.
ibid., 4-5.
10 Eva Neumaier," Missed Opportunities: Buddhism and the Ethnic Strife in Sri Lanka
a nd Tiber," in Religion and Peacebuilding, ed. Harold G. Cowa rd a nd Gordon S. Smith
(Albany: Stare University of New Yo rk Press, 2004), 69-92.
9See
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sion, solidarity, was also flawed: despite their tremendous compassion
for the Tamils left behind in 5ri Lanka, suffering at the hands of the Sri
Lankan government, tne Tam.ii diaspora not only failed to improve their
lot but may have worsened it by funding the LITE and prolonging the
war. Even now, when the future flourishing of Sri Lanka depends on a real
reckoning with the past, the diaspora has not joined in the international
calls for investigations of war crimes because such investigations would
examine war crimes committed by the LTTE as well as those by the Sri
Lankan government. This is a failure of the eudaimonistic judgment; for
the diaspora, true soli.darity ' vould require a reassessment of their own
role in the war.
Not only do the second and third judgments of compassion follow
from the first; all duee judgntents of compassion function together. If
the suffering of the other can affect us, then the possibility of breaking
through the wall of mi sin fonnation that surrounds us is much higher.
For example, if the moral ima.ginarions of those in the diaspora could
have extended compassion t() rhe Sinhalese victims of civilian bombings,
or to the refugees i11 the diaspora who left Sri Lanka fleeing the Tigers
rather than the Sri Lankan government, the diaspora might have been
able to question the veracity of the news reported by TamilNet. Thus the
eudaimonistic judgment could precede the other two and lead to more
accurate information about both the fact of suffering and whether those
who suffered deserved it, breaking through cognitive biases. That was
the case with one member of the diaspora who went to Sri Lanka after
the war and listened to famiJy members in the conflict zone tell stories
of how in the last days of the war the LITE kidnapped children after
shooting their parents. Jn thi s case the feeling of suffering-with led to a
reevaluation of the news soL1rces he had relied on for yea rs. Only then
could this member of the dias]Jora accurately assess the scope of suffering
by Sri Lankans, both Tamils and Sinhalese.
This anecdote also points ro another fact about solidarity. It is only
the particulars of the sufferi11g other that can evoke the eudairnonistic
judgment. When we allow an<Jther's suffering to affect us, it is usually the
particulars of their suffering th.at draw us in. Perhaps we can hear in our
imaginations the screams of the children who have witnessed the deaths
of their parents and then been. kidnapped by their murderers. Or perhaps,
in imagining the desperation of the parents to protect their children, we
can imagine our own childrer1 ripped from our a rms. It is the particularity
of these horrors that make our ears ring or our arms ache in sympathy
with the parents who lost their children. However, solidarity cannot end
with these particularities.
When the third judgment of compassion is working properly, the
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particula rit y of the suffering o th er lead s to a rea lization o f commo n
humanity and interde pendence. Approaching the othe r with eyes shaped
by the euda imonistic judgm ent ca n perhaps lead to a m o re accurate second judgment of compassio n, assessing whether suffe ring is deserved or
undeserved. If the Tamil d ias pora were a ble to see Sinha la civilians as in
some way suffering at the hands of the same autocratic regime that ran
roughshod over Tamil civilians in its quest to va nquish the LITE, they
might have been a ble to see Sinhala civilia ns as similarly undeserving of
suffe ring. True, Tamil civilians were victims of ethnic discrimination and
exclusion , but it is a lso true that Sinhala civilians who spo ke o ut aga inst
their government were o fte n a ssassinated or disappeared.
These fa ilures of co mpassio n are certainl y no t unique to the Tamil
diaspora . Many Sinha lese civilians could not m ake accurate judgments
of compassio n coward the Ta mils in che north nor th e refugees in the
diaspo ra . Elsewhere, M a rtha N ussba um d etail s the ways in which the
compassio n o f America ns fo r the victims o f 9/11 led to a na tiona lism that
excluded Arab and South Asian immigrants. 11 M ore recentl y, the 201 5
terrorise attac ks in Pa ris ra pidly erased man y America ns' compassio n fo r
Syrian refugees and led many governo rs o f US states to try to bar the entry
o f Syrian refugees. 12 The tend ency for compassio n to be deformed into
something " narrow and self-serving" that divides us aga inst th e "other "
is a symptom of huma n sinfulness that is unive rsa l. 13 The Tamil case ca lls
attention to the ways that a particular diaspora, beca use of their access to
communications too ls and fin ancial resources in the West, can practice a
flawed form o f solida rity in a way that has significant consequences. Other
diaspo ra po pula tio ns play an important role in many conflicts aro und the
wo rld, bo th fo r good and ill-for example, the Irish American suppo rt fo r
a peace acco rd in N orthern Irela nd a nd rad ica l natio na li st websites that
stoked the confl ict in Bosnia. 14 C learl y, moving coward peace and gen uine
solidarity requires a d eepening of compassio n in order to break w hat
H o llenbach calls the "d ownwa rd spiral o f self-defense a nd aggression." 15
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Nuss baum, " Compassion and Terror," 11- 12.
Patrick H ealy and Ju lie Bosman, " GOP Governors Vow to Close Doors m Syrian
Refugees," N ew York Times, November 16, 20 15 .
11
N ussbaum, " Compassion and Terror," l 1- 12.
" See Da niel Bynam, Deadly Connections: States T hat Sponsor Terrorism (Ca mbridge:
Cambridge Un iversity Press, 2005) , 253, and Paul Hockenos, Homeland Calling: J:.xile
Patriotism and the Balkan Wars (Ithaca, Y: Co rnell University Press, 2003), 28.
11
David Ho llen bach, " Socia l Eth ics under the Sign of the Cross," Annual of the Society
o f Christian Etlncs 16 (1996 ): JO.
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TOWARD SOLIDARITY UNDER THE SIGN OF THE CROSS
Perha ps o ne of t he grea test mysteries of the human heart is why in
some cases our experi ences of s uffering lead us to feel compassio n and
solidarity for o ther sufferers a rid in oche r cases che experience of suffering inspires o nl y a defensive d esire for cont rol a nd self- p reservation. T he
flawed, partial solidarity in tlte Tamil dias po ra and other contexts m ight
be seen as combining these two possible respo nses: it expands the eudaimonistic judgment beyond the individua l self, but no t beyond one's own
group- thus failing to m ove f rom the pa rticula r experience of suffe ring
to a unive rsal view.
So man y o f the wo rld's me>st importa nt mo veme nts fo r human rights
arise precisely fro m experierice s of suffering, and yet so many o f the
world's most violent e pisodes .'.!lso arise from expe riences of suffering a nd
victim hood. Exposure to other s' suffering ca n produce similarly bifurcated
respo nses, as H ollenbach expJa ins:
The insta nta neous tra ns mis si<>n of televisio n images of human suffering can . . . have bo th positive a nd nega ti ve influences o n the public
sense of solid ariry and mo r al responsibil it y. . .. R epeated exposure
to images o f violence a nd sta rva tio n can give rise to public mo ra l
disgust, leading t o a haug lity sense o f superio rity, a deepened perceptio n of the divisio ns be1ween th e civilized " us" and the savage
" them." Such disgust leads eith er to disengagement o r co a righteous
quest fo r hegem on y in the 11ame o f ci vilizati on . 16
H ow can we m ove toward b roadening o ur eudaimoniscic judgm ent
coward the un iversal, so that w e can practice gen uine solidarity whil e
culti va ting the kind of deep engagement wi th particula r persons that
inspires solidari ty in the first place? As C hristians, this is where we must
turn to th e cross, the " preem jrient sign of ... di vine solida rity." It is in
the cross, as H ollenbach wr ites, that we find the po int of intersection
between the pa rticular and the universa l, the compassio n o f God a nd the
suffering o f humanity:

12

T he cross o f Jesus C hrist do es nor point to the p reeminence of a
kind of self-sacrifice t hat acq uiesces in vio lence or injustice. Rather,
it un veil s the mystery at th e ~ea rt of the wo rld as One who has utte r
compassion fo r all w ho suffer. The cross is the revelatio n o f divine
1

•H ollenbach, Co111111011 Good , 23 7.
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solidarity with every human whose experience is that of forsakenness and abandonment. 17
.-,,_;ti.;·
,
• _,. , ,_,,
....... ,.
The cross reassures us that the God of the universe is with us and
with all who suffer. It is also a sign that calls us to enter into the suffering world, as Christ has. And it is, of course, "the most particularistic of
all Christian symbols," as Hollenbach acknowledges. Yet he points out
that it need not function as a sign for Christians alone; it also serves an
important function as a general reminder of humanity's bloody history,
which must not be ignored. "Followers of all religions and none must
engage the questions raised by this history," Hollenbach writes."
For Christians, the cross is a sign that the finite, time-bound, and often flawed ways that we attempt to express solidarity can ultimately be
transformed by grace into something that strains toward the universal,
the cosmic. Yet the universal mystery of the cross is one that is mediated
through our own particular relationships. We experience Christ through
one another; when we find refuge in a friend who can speak the words
of compassion to us, it is then that our own suffering can bc<.:omc the
grounds for compassion for others-rather than a source of anxiety and
self-protection. When refugees find a genuine welcome, perhaps it is more
likely that they may be able to develop a broader compassion as well.
At a time when the world faces massive crises of migration, the demands
of solidarity can appear exhausting. The world's religious communities
must challenge themselves to draw on those elements of their traditions
that nourish and deepen genuine solidarity with those who are suffering. For Christians, this means once again taking refuge under the cross,
because, as Hollenbach writes, "It is here that we might discover a hope
that is not based on the illusion that we control the world." And once we
understand this, "We find the deepest source of strength to think and act
in solidarity with those who suffer."'"
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